Materiality, Law Reform, and \u3cem\u3eRegulation by Prosecution\u3c/em\u3e by Rosenzweig, Michael
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 82 Issue 4 
1984 
Materiality, Law Reform, and Regulation by Prosecution 
Michael Rosenzweig 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Rosenzweig, Materiality, Law Reform, and Regulation by Prosecution, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1007 
(1984). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/46 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MATERIALITY, LAW REFORM, AND 
REGULATION BY PROSECUTIONt 
Michael Rosenzweig* 
REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA. By Roberta s. Karmel. 
New York: Simon and Schuster. 1982. Pp. 400. $20.75. 
There has never been a paucity of criticism of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission or the laws it administ~rs. Given the Com-
mission's crucial role in ensuring the proper functioning of our se-
curities markets, this is as it should be. Indeed, Congress and the 
Commission have both recognized the value of such criticism, fre-
quently responding with appropriate amendments to the federal se-
curities laws or important changes in enforcement or regulatory 
policy. 
In light of this tradition of legislative and administrative respon-
siveness to thoughtful criticism, students of securities regulation are 
likely to approach with particular interest a book like Regulation by 
Prosecution. Written by Roberta S. Karmel, who gained a reputa-
tion for eloquence and resolve in a series of dissents to Commission 
actions during her tenure as a Commissioner, 1 the book holds prom-
ise as an important critique of the SEC, an insider's considered view 
of the appropriate direction for review and reform of Commission 
policies. 
Unfortunately, that promise is never fulfilled. Regulation by 
Prosecution is a badly conceived, poorly structured and ultimately 
confusing work. Karmel's focus is fuzzy and shifting, leaving the 
reader uncertain of her thesis for most of the book. Moreover, when 
Karmel does finally reveal the crux of her argument, it is apparent 
that she has failed to make her case. In the end, this is a profoundly 
disappointing book, unworthy of a lawyer of Karmel's considerable 
talents. 
t I wish to thank Lee Bollinger, Alfred Conard, Douglas Kahn, Cyril Moscow, Terrance 
Sandalow, Frederick Schauer, and Christina Whitman for their thoughtful comments on an 
earlier draft. I also benefited from conversations with Dennis Ross and Philip Soper. 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1973, University of Michigan; 
J.D. 1976, Columbia University. - Ed. 
I. Commissioner Karmel served from 1977 to 1980. Her eighteen published dissents are 
listed in Appendix "C" of the book, at pages 347-48. 
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I 
In her opening chapter, "The Crisis of Liberal Values," Karmel 
sets out what appears to be the thesis of her book: "[O]ver the past 
few decades the Commission has permitted its prosecutorial function 
to upset its balance as a regulator, and to impair its ability to 
reformulate its mandate for the politics and economy of the 1980s" 
(p. 17). Readers familiar with Karmel's dissenting opinions as a 
Commissioner, particularly in section 21(a)2 and rule 2(e)3 proceed-
ings, will immediately recognize this theme. Indeed, such read.-~rs 
likely will have been attracted to the book by the prospect, fortified 
by its title, that Karmel intends to extend and broaden the provoca-
tive criticisms of the Commission that she first advanced in those 
opinions. This, in short, is to be the author's "brief against the SEC's 
prosecutorial orientation" (p. 16), an argument that the Commis-
sion's adversarial approach to securities regulation has led to the sort 
of confusion and uncertainty one expects when an administrative 
agency "formulat[es] regulatory policy through the prosecution of 
enforcement cases" (p. 95). 
Had Karmel succeeded in presenting a coherent exposition of 
this theme, the book would have been valuable to scholars as well as 
practitioners of securities law. There is much to her claim that "reg-
ulation by prosecution" is unfair and misguided, and a careful devel-
opment of that argument would have been welcome. Regrettably, 
Karmel's treatment of this theme is far from careful; moreover, it 
later becomes apparent that Karmel actually writes to chide Con-
gress, not the Commission, for failing to adopt a "more promotional 
2. SEC Release No. 34-15664, (1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,014 
(Mar. 21, 1979); SEC Release No. 34-15665, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 
~ 82,015 (Mar. 21, 1979); SEC Release No. 34-15719, (1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 82,049 (Apr. 11, 1979); SEC Release No. 34-15746, (1979 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,058 (Apr. 18, 1979); SEC Release No. 34-16321, (1979-80 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,341 (Nov. S, 1979); SEC Release No. 34-16343, (1979-80 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,352 (Nov. 15, 1979). 
Section 2l(a) of the 1934 Act, IS U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982), authorizes the Commission to 
investigate possible violations of the 1934 Act, rules or regulations thereunder, and certain 
rules of securities exchanges, registered securities associations, registered clearing agencies and 
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and to publish information concerning such 
violations. 
3. SEC Release No. 34-15982, (1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,124 
(July 2, 1979); SEC Release No. 33-6105 (Aug. 15, 1979), 18 SEC DocKET 64 (1979); SEC 
Release No. 34-16225, (1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,334 (Sept. 27, 
1979); SEC Release No. 34-16448 (Dec. 21, 1979), 19 SEC DocKET 12 (1980); SEC Release 
No. 34-16479, (1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,446 (Jan. 10, 1980). 
Under Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1983), the Commis-
sion may implement administrative proceedings to deny lawyers or accountants the ability to 
practice before the SEC because of (1) failure to possess the "requisite qualifications to repre-
sent others," (2) failure to maintain a proper level of "character or integrity," (3) involvement 
in ''unethical or improper professional conduct," or (4) willful violation (or willful aiding and 
abetting of a violation) of any provision of the federal securities laws or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(l)(i), (ii), (iii) (1983). 
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regulatory attitude" that would equate "investor protection . . with 
capital formation" (p. 297). After castigating the Commission for 
most of the book, Karmel's unexpected turn blunts her earlier criti-
cism, and leaves the reader wondering about her true objectives. The 
result is less than satisfactory; we know that Karmel is irate, but it is 
not clear why, nor can we be certain that her indignation is justified. 
Before considering Karmel's shifting focus, let us examine her 
"brief' against the Commission, which occupies nearly two-thirds of 
the book.4 Karmel cites four examples of so-called "misguided 
prosecutorial regulation" (p. 99) by the Commission: (1) its promo-
tion of a "national market system";5 (2) its role in the "corporate 
governance" movement;6 (3) its enthusiasm for 'jurisdictional ex-
pansionism";7 and (4) its responsibility for the "erosion" of material-
ity as a disclosure standard.8 None of these is a compelling 
illustration of undue prosecutorial orientation. 
Consider, for example, the Commission's efforts to foster a na-
tional market system. In the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,9 
Congress delegated to the Commission responsibility for facilitating 
"a nationwide interactive market system"10 for the trading of securi-
ties. As Karmel acknowledges, the Commission has not attempted 
to design and implement a national market system, choosing instead 
to rely on "self-regulation and evolutionary change as a way to per-
mit marketplace forces to determine [the system's] important con-
tours" (p. 111).11 Karmel criticizes this approach as an example of 
"prosecutorial regulation" (p. 99), but never reveals precisely how 
4. Roughly speaking, I refer here to chapters three through seven, pages 77 through 247. 
5. Chapter four, pp. 101-38. 
6. Chapter five, pp. 139-86. 
7. Chapter six, pp. 187-229. In this chapter, Karmel criticizes the Commission for "prose-
cuting cases in which its jurisdiction is questionable," p. 189, addressing the growth of implied 
remedies, the relationship between federal and state securities regulation, the extraterritorial 
application of the federal securities laws, the SEC's use of consent injunctions, and practice 
regarding so-called Wells submissions (submissions to the Commission staff by prospective 
defendants or respondents in an effort to dissuade the staff from prosecuting). I do not deal 
separately with this discussion, principally because it may be criticized on essentially the same 
grounds as Karmel's treatment of the other three examples she cites. Her argument that 
this is "regulation by prosecution" is unconvincing, and much of her analysis is simply 
careless. 
8. Chapter seven, pp. 230-47. 
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § l 1A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1982). See gener-
ally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 8-11, 492-97 (5th ed. 1982); Poser, 
Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 883 (1981). 
10. SEC Release No. 34-13662 (June 23, 1977), 12 SEC DOCKET 947, 952 (1979). 
11. Congress also avoided precise definition of the national market system. Thus, section 
l 1A(a)(2) merely requires the Commission to promote a trading system in furtherance of cer-
tain enumerated objectives: 
(i) economically efficient execution of securities transactions; 
(ii) fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between 
exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets; 
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"the Commission has tended to look and think like a prosecutor" (p. 
106) in promoting a national market system. 12 In short, her criti-
cisms of the Commission's efforts to create a national market system 
are simply irrelevant to her thesis. She is unlikely to move the 
reader with her unsupported conclusion that the SEC's 
"prosecutorial orientation . . . has merely served to obfuscate the 
regulatory character of the national market system that is promo-
tional" (p. 112). 13 
Karmel's discussion of the SEC's role in the "corporate gover-
nance" movement ( chapter 5) is similarly flawed. Karmel focuses on 
the Commission's position with respect to management fraud and 
"sensitive" payments (tracing the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977)14, its well-publicized corporate governance 
hearings and the rule-making initiatives that grew out of those hear-
ings, and its view of the proper role of corporate counsel.15 In each 
instance, except perhaps the last, 16 Karmel fails to persuade the 
(iii) the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of information with respect to quota-
tions for and transactions in securities; 
(iv) the practicability of brokers executing investors' orders in the best market; and 
(v) an opportunity . . . for investors' orders to be executed without the participation of a 
dealer. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § llA(a)(l)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(l)(9 (1982). 
12. Indeed, Karmel concedes that her "real quarrel is not with the Commission or its staff, 
but with the Congress, which passed the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975." P. 102. But 
the reader is left to speculate about the nature of her "real quarrel." One might imagine 
Karmel disparaging Congress for affording so central a role to a law enforcement agency with 
an "historical prosecutorial orientation," p. 103, but she evidently recognizes that "government 
agencies with primarily prosecutorial functions seem better able to maintain 'the public's confi• 
dence than agencies that are promotional." P. 109. Nor does she offer any examples of the 
''vigorous prosecutorial response," p. 109, that she attributes to the Commission in its dis-
charge of Congress' mandate. 
13. As this passage indicates, Karmel's claims are also somewhat difficult to fathom at 
times. Additional examples abound. For instance, she argues that the "specifications of [a 
national market system] essentially are operational design matters [that] should not be decided 
by a lawyer dominated government agency," pp. 109-10, yet fails to recognize that her own 
observations about the Commission's reliance on "self-regulation and evolutionary change," p. 
110, largely belie this criticism. 
In fact, so confused is Karmel that one is unsure whether her final observations in this 
section of the book are critical or laudatory: 
[W]hile I believe that the SEC should become more understanding and more cooperative 
in its relations with the securities industry, I also believe that the Commission has neither 
the resources nor the expertise to engage in classical promotional regulation of the eco-
nomic structure and development of the securities markets. Further, I believe that the 
Commission's search for new programs and precedents in such controversial areas as cor-
porate governance is due partly to a transformation of the SEC's role as a policeman of 
the securities industry to a role that is more promotional. 
P. 138. Throughout most of the rest of the book, Karmel argues in favor of the "transforma-
tion" she appears to decry here. Is the Commission to be praised or disparaged for its attempts 
to become "more promotional''? 
14. Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff 
(1982)). 
15. It is with respect to the last question that Karmel is perhaps best known, mainly for her 
dissents to Rule 2(e) proceedings by the Commission. See note 3 supra. 
16. Karmel attacks the Commission's use of civil litigation and especially administrative 
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reader that the Commission's orientation was unduly 
"prosecutorial." Moreover, her criticisms of the Commission on 
other grounds are superficial at best. · 
Karmel's objections to the Commission's corporate governance 
program derive essentially from her claim that the Commission has 
ignored the basic tenet that the securities laws are "disclosure rather 
than standard-setting provisions" (p. 140). Thus, she argues that the 
Commission's decision in the late 1960's and early 1970's to require 
disclosure of "questionable payments and management fraud" rep-
resented an attempt to curb particular behavior by corporations and 
their agents rather than an effort to provide shareholders and inves-
tors with useful information. She asserts that "the obfuscation of 
[the] conflict between economic and social values has caused corpo-
rate governance reform proposals to be premised on the erroneous 
assumption that the interests of management and shareholders are 
antagonistic" (p. 143),17 and upbraids the Commission for its belief 
that "economic and social values" do not necessarily conflict. In 
other words, she apparently rejects the notion that, long-run profit 
proceedings under Rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1983), to promote 
greater lawyer responsibility. Pp. 173-83. This discussion, summarizing arguments she made 
in an earlier article, Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the 
SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747 (1975), and as a Commissioner in a series of dissents to Rule 2(e) 
proceedings, see note 3 supra, is forceful and persuasive. Thus, she convincingly questions 
Commission authority to set standards of professional conduct for lawyers, and notes the dan-
gers of the Commission's program: SEC discipline oflawyers threatens "government conscrip-
tion of corporate counsel as a 'civil policeman' to disclose confidences and enforce the law," p. 
183, and undermines the lawyer-client relationship and the goal of disclosing material infor-
mation by encouraging lawyers to resolve all doubtful cases in favor of disclosure. 
The SEC's Division of Enforcement has dramatically curtailed actions against lawyers 
since 1981. Whether in response to the increasingly vocal criticisms its policies provoked, see, 
e.g., Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 774 
(1979); Klein, The SEC and the Legal Profession: Material Adverse Developments, 11 INST. ON 
SEC. REG. 597 (Practising Law Institute) (1979); Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAW. 
987, 991, 996 (1980); Note, SEC Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attorneys Under Rule 2(e), 19 
MICH. L. REv. 1270 (1981), or for other reasons, see note 35 infra, this development marks a 
sensible change in enforcement policy. 
17. Karmel relies on Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and 
Means Reconsidered, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 388,414 (1977). Professor Werner argues that man-
agement and shareholders have an identity of interest in corporate profit maximization, owing 
partly to the constraints imposed on management by markets such as the market for corporate 
control He implies that this identity of interest helps foster investor confidence in the capital 
markets, which might diminish were management required to pursue goals that could conflict 
with profit maximization, such as corporate social responsibility. He asserts, in other words, 
that the market constraints that help "keep management in line" would less effectively en-
hance investor confidence were management obliged to follow a course adverse to profit max-
imization. 
Karmel apparently believes that requiring disclosure of economically immaterial informa-
tion similarly threatens the capital markets, but fails to recognize the irrelevance to her argu-
ment of the market constraints that are so central to Professor Werner's point. That is, even if 
one agrees with Professor Werner that those market constraints are ineffective in promoting 
management pursuit of goals other than profit maximization (a question beyond the scope of 
this review), it does not follow that mandating disclosure of economically insignificant infor-
mation is inappropriate. See notes 29-54 infra and accompanying text. 
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being the ultimate goal of the corporation, there is no necessary clash 
between corporate profitability and corporate social responsibility: 18 
[T]he SEC should be thinking about corporate governance in terms of 
the needs of corporate America to raise capital in order to increase 
productivity to more effectively deliver jobs, goods and services in the 
increasingly competitive international marketplace. The Commission 
should stop worrying about how to improve corporate morality and 
social responsibility and start worrying about how to encourage the 
public to put dollars into savings and investment instead of consump-
tion. [P. 145]. 
Although Karmel recognizes that '~ component of investor confi-
dence is faith in the honesty and integrity of business" (p. 146, em-
phasis added), she reveals a rather limited understanding of the 
obvious relationship between "improv[ing] corporate morality and 
social responsibility" and "encourag[ing] the public to put dollars 
into savings and investment" (p. 145). Thus, she evidently believes 
that the mere absence of outright fraud by corporate management 
suffices to foster investor confidence, leading her to criticize the 
Commission too harshly for its enforcement activity against behav-
ior which is less than fraudulent: 
[T]he reason why the SEC's initiatives regarding corporate governance 
have been at best confused, and often misguided, is that. the Commis-
sion's management fraud program of the 1970s lost sight of the eco-
nomic orientation of investors and became a political adventure. This 
occurred when the SEC made a transition from management fraud 
cases involving self-dealing to management integrity cases based on 
poor corporate citizenship. [P. 146]. · 
This view ultimately derives from Karmel's position regarding 
the linchpin concept of "materiality" in the disclosure system that 
has evolved under the federal securities laws. 19 Indeed, her criticisms 
18. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 167-73 {3d ed. 1978); J. SEARS, 
THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 209 (1929); SEC Chairman Williams Warns Business: 
Clean Up Your Act, NATION'S BUSINESS, Sept. 1980, at 57, 58. 
Of course, scholars have argued about this question since at least the early 1930's, when 
Professors Dodd and Berle debated the point in their famous Harvard Law Review exchange. 
See Dodd, For 1Vhom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); 
Berle, For 1Vhom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). 
See also A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954); Weiner, Tlze 
Berle-JJodd JJialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964); PRIN• 
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDA· 
TIONS § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982). 
19. See notes 20-26 infra and accompanying text. 
By focusing on disclosure policy, Karmel ignores the larger issues of "corporate social re-
sponsibility" that she herself mentions (ls there a conflict between economic and social values? 
ls corporate social responsibility consistent with corporate profitability?), and confusingly im-
plies that the Commission's disclosure philosophy and recent "corporate governance reform 
proposals" raise simi}.ar questions. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, as I 
suggest below, her criticisms of SEC disclosure policy are themselves misguided, mainly be-
cause they rest on an overly narrow view of the "materiality" concept. That is, Karmel as-
sumes without much discussion that investors have no legitimate interest in non-economic 
matters. Because she never seriously defends the validity of that assumption, her analysis begs 
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of the Commission's use of disclosure rules to promote corporate 
governance reform are essentially repeated, with somewhat greater 
amplitude, in a later chapter in which she describes "the erosion of 
materiality" (p. 230) as a separate example of "regulation by prose-
cution." Because Karmel's views regarding materiality therefore 
produce two of her four illustrative cases of "misguided 
prosecutorial regulation," it is appropriate that they be examined in 
some detail. 
II 
The federal securities laws, of course, require the disclosure of 
certain specified information, as well as other information that is 
"material" to investment and voting decisions. 20 Obviously, the key 
question in determining whether a disclosure obligation has been 
breached, assuming that disclosure of the item in question is not spe-
cifically required by statute, rule or form,21 is therefore the question 
of materiality. 
one of the central questions in the ongoing debate regarding materiality. See notes 29-63 i'!fra 
and accompanying text. One wonders whether a willingness to address the important issues 
she avoids would have led Karmel to a different understanding of SEC disclosure policy. 
Compare Werner, supra note 17. 
20. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) (registration and prospectus re-
quirements in connection with public offerings of securities);§ 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) 
(prohibiting fraud in offer or sale of securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § lO(b}, 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (prohibiting manipulative or deceptive practices in purchase or sale of 
securities); § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982) (annual and periodic reporting requirements); 
§ 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1982) (requirements for issuer tender offers); § 14(a}, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n(a) (1982) (requirements for proxy soliciations); § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982) (re-
quirements for tender offers by other than issuer);§ 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (prohibit-
ing fraud in tender offers); see also SEC Rules lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1983); 14a-9, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983). 
21. Through its authority to promulgate rules and forms, the Commission imposes specific 
affirmative disclosure requirements that apply in a variety of settings. These, of course, are the 
disclosures routinely required in 1933 Act registration statements, tender offer materials, and 
the like. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1982) (SEC authority to promul-
gate rules or regulations regarding content of registration statement); Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 § 12(b)(l}, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b)(l) (1982) (SEC authority to require issuers having securi-
ties traded on a national securities exchange to file registration containing such information as 
may be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors); 
§ 12(g}(l}, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g}(l} (1982) (same regarding issuers having total assets exceeding 
$1,000,000 and a class of equity securities held by five hundred or more persons) (By rule, 
§ 12(g)(l) now applies only to issuers having total assets exceeding $3,000,000. See SEC Rule 
12g-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-l (1983).); § 13{a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982) (SEC authority to 
prescribe information required to be disclosed in annual and periodic reports by issuers of 
securities registered under section 12); § 13(d)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982) (SEC authority 
to prescribe information required to be disclosed by persons owning more than five percent of 
any equity security registered under section 12); § 13(e)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(l) (1982) (SEC 
authority to prescribe information required to be disclosed in connection with issuer tender 
offers); § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982) (SEC authoij.ty to promulgate rules and regulations 
regarding the solicitation of proxies in respect of securities registered under § 12, as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors); § 14(d)(l), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n(d)(l) (1982) (SEC authority to prescribe information required to be disclosed by tender 
offerors). 
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There is little dispute regarding the articulated test of materiality 
under the federal securities laws. SEC Rule 405,22 promulgated 
under the 1933 Act, defines as material "those matters to which there 
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach 
importance in determining whether to purchase the security regis-
tered." In the context of a proxy solicitation, the Supreme Court has 
held that a fact is material if 
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . Put another way, 
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having sig-
nificantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available.23 
Materiality is often easy to discern and uncontroversial. Thus, 
information of financial significance because of its impact on such 
items as a company's earnings, assets or liabilities generally must be 
disclosed under traditional quantitative notions of materiality.24 In 
enacting the federal securities laws, Congress plainly intended to re-
quire the disclosure of information having economic significance for 
investors and shareholders.25 Indeed, there has never been any seri-
ous doubt that Congress perceived "the primary interest of investors 
[to be] economic."26 Accordingly, no one has ever questioned the 
obligation to disclose economically material information; that obliga-
tion is at the very core of the securities laws. 
Karmel argues, however, that the Commission has "eroded" the 
materiality concept, revealing the agency's lamentable inclination to 
"formulat[e] regulatory policy through the prosecution of enforce-
ment cases" (p. 95). She relies on three illustrations to support this 
claim: (1) the Commission's insistence on standards of "qualitative," 
as distinguished from merely "quantitative" materiality (p. 233); (2) 
the Commission's related tendency to require disclosure of regula-
22. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1983). See also SEC Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1983) 
(substantially identical definition of materiality under 1934 Act). 
23. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (footnote omitted). The courts 
have also applied this standard in non-proxy settings. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977); Kidwell ex rel Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1293 n.9 (9th Cir. 
1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 
(1978). 
24. See, e.g., SEC Release No. 33-5627, (1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED, SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 80,310 (Oct. 14, 1975); SEC Release No. 33-5704, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED, 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 80,495 (May 6, 1976). 
25. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933) (House Report accompanying 1933 
Act); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934) (Senate Report accompanying 1934 Act). 
26. SEC Release No. 33-5627, (1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 
~ 80,310, at 85,721 (Oct. 14, 1975): 
After all, the principal, if not the only reason why people invest their money in,securities 
is to obtain a return. A variety of other motives are [sic] probably present in 'the invest-
ment decisions of numerous investors but the only co=on thread is the hope for a satis-
factory return, and it is to this that a disclosure scheme intended to be useful to all must be 
primarily addressed. 
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tory violations by issuers;27 and (3) the Commission's promotion of 
shareholder proposals and the inclusion of those proposals in issuer 
proxy statements. 28 
On the subjects of qualitative and quantitative materiality and 
the SEC's position regarding disclosure of regulatory violations,29 
Karmel argues that the Commission has erred by "too frequently 
permitt[ing] materiality concepts to be developed through the prose-
cution of enforcement cases dealing with management integrity and 
regulatory violations, without any conceptual linkage of such con-
cepts to a materiality standard usable in financial reporting" (p. 231 ). 
She also faults the Commission for "substitut(ing] moral for eco-
nomic or legal materiality" (p. 234), which she apparently believes 
followed the agency's refusal to recognize that the "investor is an 
economic, rather than a political or philosophical creature .... In-
vestors are concerned about a good return on their investment" (p. 
235). 
But these claims beg the question. Karmel assumes without 
analysis that qualitatively significant information is not important to 
investors, and proceeds to criticize the Commission for mistakenly 
asserting securities law violations for failure to disclose such infor-
mation. The question worth addressing, of course, is the one 
Karmel ignores: Should information having no immediate quantita-
tive or economic impact on a company's financial position nonethe-
less be deemed material in certain circumstances? That is, are there 
27. Karmel's disapproval of these requirements is apparent from her consequent character-
ization of the Commission as "the policeman for Washington ••. more concerned about im-
proving business morality and imposing liability on public corporations than it is concerned 
about investor preferences and the capital formation process." P. 238. 
28. Karmel criticizes the Commission for assuming the role of "political activist," arguing 
that "[i]n its decision to permit shareholder proposals to be included in issuer proxy soliciting 
materials, the Commission has made no effort to enforce a materiality standard." P. 245. See 
note 63 infra. 
29. The Commission's position with respect to these matters is changing. In remarks made 
recently before an American Bar Association group, John M. Fedders, Director of the SEC's 
Division of Enforcement, observed that "the Commission generally should not utilize the 
antifraud provisions of the securities laws for law enforcement where there is a failure to dis-
close conduct which may be considered qualitatively material. . . . If unlawful conduct could 
not have a material economic effect on a corporation, it is not likely to be considered important 
by a reasonable investor contemplating an investment or voting decision." Speech by John M. 
Fedders on Failure to Disclose Illegal Conduct, 14 SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 2057, 2057-58 
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Fedders Speech]. Fedders' comments, coming soon after the Com-
mission's well-publicized decision not to bring enforcement proceedings against Citicorp for its 
alleged violations of foreign banking and tax laws, see Freeman, The SEC and the Citicorp 
Case: The Legal Issue of Materiality, NATL. L.J., Nov. 15, 1982, at 20; Gerth, SEC Overruled 
Staff on Finding that Citicorp Hid Foreign Profits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at Al, evidently 
repudiate the notion that information bearing on management's integrity or other qualitatively 
significant matters may be material to investors without regard to such information's quantita-
tive impact on a company's financial position. See also Schneider, Qualitative and Other Soft 
Information Disclosures, 15 INST. ON SEC. REG. 35, 50-55 (Practising Law Institute) (1983); 
Tyler,Amhiguous Rules Prevented Mobil Disclosure, Ex-Aide at SEC Says, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 
1982, at A6. Karmel's view of disclosure is not significantly different. 
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circumstances in which such information is likely to be important to 
the reasonable investor or shareholder?30 It is that question - what 
information is important to investors? - that lies at the core of the 
materiality debate, and Karmel's critique of Commission enforce-
ment activity is sound only to the extent one accepts her underlying 
characterization of investors and her corresponding view that quan-
titatively irrelevant information is not material. In other words, her 
criticisms bear less on enforcement practices than on the materiality 
standard itself. Accordingly, in the remainder of this section, I will 
address Karmel's implicit view of materiality rather than dwell fur-
ther on her claims regarding "regulation by prosecution." 
Karmel's failure to reflect thoughtfully on the investor's informa-
tional needs presents a view of materiality that is misguided in at 
least two respects. First, she assumes that those informational needs, 
however defined, are identical in all contexts; an investor deciding 
whether to buy, hold or sell, she claims, requires precisely the same 
information as a shareholder deciding how to vote in an election of 
directors.31 This is overly simplistic, and happens incidentally to ig-
nore a body of case law and scholarly literature to the contrary.32 
That case law and scholarly literature suggest, sensibly, that an in-
vestor's informational needs vary with the setting and decision con-
fronting the investor. For example, it is not obvious, despite 
Karmel's assumption to the contrary, that shareholders voting in an 
election of directors have no interest in information bearing on the 
honesty of director candidates, even if that information is both quan-
titatively insignificant and unimportant to an investor's trading strat-
30. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
31. Here, as elsewhere, Karmel offers little more than ipse dixit: 
[T)he distinction between information that is material to a purchaser or seller of securities, 
and information that is material to a stockholder voting a proxy, is essentially falla-
cious. . . . Accordingly, the distinction between materiality for the trading markets and 
mat.eriality for proxy solicitation, even if legally or theoretically justifiable, should be 
discarded. 
P. 235. 
I suggest below that the monolithic materiality standard Karmel favors might improperly 
constrict the class of information that must be disclosed to investors. Ironically, however, 
Karmel's approach may also lead her to a view of materiality that is at times over-inclusive. 
Thus, Karmel agrees that certain information bearing on management's integrity - namely 
information about management conflicts of interest - is "an appropriate subject for SEC 
mandated disclosure," p. 147, but overlooks the argument that such information may be rela-
tively less important to an investor deciding on trading strategy than to a shareholder deciding 
whether to vote for management's slate of directors. 
32. See, e.g., authorities cited at note 23 supra; Ferrera, 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULA· 
TION 918 (1961); Starr & Steinberg, .Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management Integrity 
and Competency, 76 Nw. u. L. REV. 555, 559-60 (1981); see also M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS 77 (1983); Longstreth, SEC .Disclosure Policy Regardi11g Management In-
tegrity, 38 Bus. LAW. 1413 (1983); Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the .Disclosure Re-
quirements of the Federal Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 798-99 (1982), Again, 
ime is troubled as much by Karmel's approach as by her conclusions. This, quite simply, is not 
careful work. 
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egy. Perhaps a respectable argument supporting that proposition 
can be made, 33 but Karmel offers none. 
Beyond nice questions of context, however, Karmel's underlying 
view of materiality - that investors care only about "a good return 
on their investment" (p. 235)34 -is more deeply disturbing.35 Her 
central point is that a sensible materiality standard requires certainty 
and predictability; an exclusively quantitative standard, she argues, 
would provide such certainty and predictability while, not inciden-
tally, comporting with the informational needs of investors and the 
intent of Congress. What she overlooks, however, is the inherent un-
certainty of the materiality concept. In order to accomplish what is 
surely a desirable goal - clear-cut, unambiguous and certain disclo-
sure standards - she would define materiality quite inflexibly, intro-
ducing an artificiality that the concept cannot (and should not) bear. 
Only by affording the Commission a degree of discretion in fashion-
ing its disclosure policy can we preserve the sort of sensitivity we 
require of sound law enforcement.36 Novel and difficult disclosure 
33. See, e.g., Branch & Rubright, Integrity of Management .Disclosures Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 1447, 1466-76 (1982). 
34. Although she is by no means clear, Karmel may in fact be making two distinct, albeit 
related, claims. First, and most obviously, she seems to assert that investors simply do not 
need or desire information which is not quantitatively or economically significant. Second, she 
also appears to argue, much less perceptibly, that Congress never intended that the securities 
laws embrace a theory of qualitative materiality. The second argument, of course, is the more 
powerful, for it supports a narrower view of materiality even if one believes that investors do 
attach importance to qualitatively significant information. Thus, insofar as the materiality 
question is one of congressional intent, it is in a sense irrelevant that investors may legitimately 
care whether their managers are making bribes or evading the tax laws; what matters is 
whether Congress, in enacting securities laws which based disclosure obligations on the "mate-
riality" of information, thought that investors cared or should care about such matters. 
Despite Karmel's imprecison, one cannot analyze her view of materiality without address-
ing both of these claims. I argue below that neither claim supports her position. 
35. For the present, at least, the Commission's Division of Enforcement appears to agree 
with Karmel. See note 29 supra. Of course, the Division's position, like Karmel's, is sound 
only insofar as its assumptions regarding investors' informational concerns (and perhaps Con-
gress' intent, see note 34 supra) withstand challenge. In a real sense, therefore, my views also 
represent a critique of the Commission's current disclosure policy, as well as a defense of its 
earlier philosophy. This reveals not only the practical significance of arguments regarding 
disclosure theory, but also the political context in which administrative agencies function. 
That is, the political temperament of the Director of the Division of Enforcement (as well as 
that of the President and SEC Chairman responsible for the Director's appointment) probably 
explains the Commission's disclosure philosophy as usefully as the sometimes illuminating 
debates undertaken by students of securities regulation. One can only hope that concededly 
political enforcement positions, at some level, rest upon consistent and sensible legal theories. 
36. One should distingush, however, between a desire for precision and certainty, on the 
one hand, and a desire to eliminate non-quantitative factors for substantive reasons, on the 
other. Although Karmel fails to make this distinction, one could eliminate moral and other 
non-economic factors yet have a relatively subjective materiality standard, and one could in-
clude those factors yet have a precise and certain standard, such as by listing the types of 
information that must be disclosed. Karmel appears to believe that precision is desirable for 
its own sake and that qualitative information - such as facts bearing on management's integ-
rity - should be deemed immaterial so as to preclude the Commission from using putative 
discl~sure violations to regulate corporate conduct, which she views as unauthorized and dan-
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questions do not disappear simply because they are defined away in 
an effort to draw a bright line; to achieve certainty at the expense of 
a realistic standard of materiality would be an empty accomplish-
ment indeed. 
Courts and commentators have long recognized the materiality 
of qualitatively significant information, including information re-
garding illegal conduct by a company or its management,37 socially 
significant information,38 and, most notably, information generally 
relevant to an assessment of management's character, integrity, or 
competence.39 Plainly, however, some types of qualitative informa-
tion40 are more material than others: shareholders and investors 
care more about management's honesty and competence than its 
policies concerning employment discrimination or environmental 
pollution.41 But Karmel fails to distinguish among these different 
gerous. I address these points separately below, arguing that (1) precision may not be attaina-
ble in every circumstance, see notes 56-62 infra and accompanying text, and (2) the test of 
materiality should be the significance of information to investors, even if that produces disclo-
sure requirements which incidentally affect corporate conduct, see notes 49 & 50 infra and 
accompanying text. 
My argument would yield a more flexible approach to disclosure regulation, although I 
recognize that even a flexible approach has its limits. See note 41 infra. See also notes 52-54 
infra and accompanying text. To recognize such limitations, however, is not to reject entirely 
the materiality of qualitatively significant information; it is only to suggest certain concerns to 
which the Commission should be sensitive. 
31. See, e.g., SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978), 
38. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974). 
But see Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D,D.C. 1977), revd., 
606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Worlfors Union v. J.P. 
Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980); 
SEC v. Chicago Helicopter Indus., No. 79-C-0469 slip op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 1980), vacated, 
No. 79-C-0469 slip op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 1980); note 41 infra and accompanying text. 
39. See, e.g., SEC v. Carriba Air, Inc., FED, SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 98,766 (11th Cir. 1983); 
SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1982); Zell v. Intercapital In• 
come Sec., 675 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1982); Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); GAF Corp. v. Heyman, [1982-83 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 99,237 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bank and Trust of Old York Road 
Co. v. Hankin, (1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 99,070 (E.D.Pa. 1982); 
Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kalmanovitz, (1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 98,873 
(D. Del. 1982); General Steel Indus. v. Walco Natl. Corp., (1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED, 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 98,402 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Bertoglio v. Texas Intl. Co., [1979-80 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,342 (D. Del. 1980); Berman v. Gerber Prod. Co., 454 F. 
Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Cooke 
v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also In re Franchard Corp., 42 
S.E.C. 163 (1964); M. STEINBERG, supra note 32, at 73-131; Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, supra 
note 32; Longstreth, supra note 32; Roiter, supra note 32. 
40. I exclude from this discussion qualitative information that is independently material on 
economic or quantitative grounds. For example, a pattern of illegal management conduct 
which jeopardizes a significant amount of a company's earnings or assets would be disclosable 
even under traditional notions of economic materiality. See, e.g., Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, 
Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1982) (failure to disclose that sales growth resulted from illegal 
payments may be material if payments or business thereby secured are significant in amount); 
SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (kickback scheme that 
threatens suspension of important licenses may be economically material). 
41. The Commission itself has found that "investors who consider social information [such 
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types of qualititative information. 
Thus, despite convincing arguments and data to the contrary,42 
she claims that investors view environmental, equal employment op-
portunity and similar socially significant information as indistin-
guishable from all other qualitative information, including 
information bearing on management's integrity (p. 242), and there-
fore infers from investors' uninterest in the former that no qualita-
tive information is material. But investors' unconcern with socially 
significant information suggests only that that information is not ma-
terial. Arguably, investors have a genuine interest in at least certain 
management integrity information - e.g., facts revealing self-deal-
ing or adjudicated violations of law - which is therefore often mate-
rial. Where the shareholder is being asked to vote for management, 
or candidates closely allied with management, the relevance of such 
information is plain.43 But even investors not being solicited for 
proxies would find such information important in judging the stew-
ardship of the company whose stock they are holding,44 buying or 
selling. As the Commission noted in its famous opinion in In re 
Franchard Corp.: "Of cardinal importance in any business is the 
quality of its management. . . . Evaluation of the quality of man-
agement - to whatever extent it is possible - is an essential ingredi-
ent of informed investment decision."45 
as the effect of corporate activities on the environment and statistics about equal employment 
practices] important .•.. constitute ..• an insignificant percentage of ... U.S. sharehold-
ers." SEC Release No. 33-5627, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 80,310, 
at 85,719 (Oct 14, 1975). Hence, even before its recent change in enforcement policy, see note 
29 supra, the SEC rarely viewed socially significant information as material apart from its 
economic relevance. (For a time, the Commission required disclosure of all environmental 
administrative proceedings, whether initiated by the issuer or by a governmental authority, 
and regardless of the amount of money involved. See, e.g., In re United States Steel Corp., 
SEC Release No. 34-16223, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,319, at 
82,383-84 (Sept. 27, 1979). However, the Commission adopted this position in light of the 
national policy expressed in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and, in any event, 
subsequently revised its rules to require disclosure of only economically significant proceedings. 
See Regulation S-K, Item 103, Instruction 5, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, (1983).) Apparently, only 
one court has ruled otherwise, see Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 
689 (D.D.C. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 
1977), and it was reversed on appeal. 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
42. See note 41 supra. 
43. See, e.g., Fedders Speech, supra note 29, at 2057; TWA v. Catalano, [1979-80 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 97,159 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 
F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
44. I do not address the question whether, absent a purchase or sale of a security, a com-
pany ever has an affirmative duty to disclose. See generally Bauman, Rule J0b-5 and the Cor-
poration's Affirmative JJuty to JJisc/ose, 61 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979). 
45. 42 S.E.C. 163, 169-70 (1964). See also SEC v. Freeman, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,361 (N.D. Ill. 1978). Bui see Branch & Rubright, supra note 33, at 
1457-58; note 31 supra and accompanying text. 
Note that SEC forms, see note 21 supra, sometimes specifically require disclosure of adju-
dicated violations oflaw. See Regulation S-K, Item 401(f), 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(!) (1983) (set-
ting forth disclosure requirements applicable to (1) 1933 Act registration statements on Form 
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Therefore, despite the conceded centrality of economic material-
ity,46 a sound disclosure policy should require the dissemination of 
certain kinds of information without regard to questions of financial 
significance. Although Congress clearly intended that Commission 
disclosure authority focus on quantitatively significant informa-
tion,47 the legislative history of the federal securities laws also 
reveals Congress' belief that investors often require information that 
may be economically immaterial.48 Of course, requiring the disclo-
sure of such information may affect substantive corporate conduct,49 
but that is no reason for adopting a materiality standard that would 
deprive investors of needed information. One can legitimately criti-
cize the SEC for using its disclosure authority artfully to regulate 
substantive conduct where the Commission requires the disclosure of 
information in which investors have no interest;50 but if investors 
believe that certain information is pertinent to investment or voting 
decisions, the Commission should require its production despite the 
impact that policy may have on corporate conduct. This is merely to 
restate the obvious: what matters most in fashioning a materiality 
standard is the significance of particular information to investors. 
To so recognize, of course, does not solve the problems that beset 
S-1, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 8,251 (1983) (Item 11); (2) 1934 Act Annual Report on Form 
10-K, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 31,105 (1983) (Item 10); and (3) Schedule 14A, pertaining to 
proxy statements, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1983) (Item 6(a)). 
46. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text. 
41. ·See authorities cited in note 25 supra. 
48. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934) ("[I]t is ·essential that [the 
stockholder] be enlightened not only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also 
as to the major questions of policy, which are decided at stockholders' meetings."); H.R. REP. 
No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968),reprinledin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2811, 
2812 (House Report accompanying the Williams Act) ("The competence and integrity of a 
company's management, and of the persons who seek management positions, are of vital im-
portance to stockholders. Secrecy in this area is inconsistent with the expectations of the people 
who invest in the securities of publicly held corporations and impairs public confidence in 
securities as a medium of investment."). 
49. This has long been recognized as an inevitable and frequently desirable consequence of 
disclosure requirements. See L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS 
. UsE IT 92 (1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most effi-
cient policeman."); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE WHEAT REPORT: DISCLO-
SURE TO INVESTORS - A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE 
'33 AND '34 ACTS 50-51 (1969). 
Where the conduct at issue constitutes a breach of fiduciary responsibility under state law, 
imposing a disclosure obligation raises interesting and difficult federalism issues. See Santa Fe 
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). While these 
issues are beyond the scope of this review, I find persuasive the suggestion that "[r]equiring 
adequate disclosure in appropriate circumstances •.. may be viewed as an acceptable juris-
prudential accommodation between the federal interest in full disclosure and the state interest 
in redressing breaches of fiduciary duty." Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, supra note 32, at 563 
(footnote omitted). 
50. For example, putting to one side the argument that the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969 makes environmental disclosure a special case, it would be inappropriate for the 
Commission, in the face of obvious investor uninterest, see note 41 supra, to require firms to 
reveal economically insignificant information about their environmental policies. 
February 1984) Regulation by Prosecution 1021 
efforts to shape meaningful disclosure requirements for qualitatively 
significant information. There remain difficult and often subjective 
questions about disclosure theory, and countervailing considerations 
may dictate different results in other settings.51 For example, I have 
already noted my agreement with Karmel that the Commission 
ought not require disclosure of socially significant information;52 in-
vestors do not want such information, and to require its disclosure 
would dangerously involve the SEC in the making of social policy. 
Similarly, even if one believes that investors might want informa-
tion about potential violations of law, to require disclosure of such 
information would be to endow the Commission with authority ef-
fectively to administer and enforce laws far removed from that 
agency's presumed expertise. Quite apart from the danger of, in ef-
fect, requiring management "to accuse itself of illegal behavior,"53 
this would entangle the Commission in complex legal issues having 
nothing to do with securities regulation per se; it is doubtful that 
Congress envisioned the Commission determining violations of the 
banking and tax laws, nor does such a role make sense as a matter of 
policy.54 
51. Some would claim, for example, that "ethical investors" do attach importance to so-
cially significant matters, such·as a company's policies regarding equal employment opportu-
nity or the environment. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 
689, 700 (D.D.C. 1974); Stevenson, The SEC and the New JJisclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 
58-66 (1976). On the other hand, even assuming general agreement that information bearing 
on management's honesty and competence may be material, some such information is not 
terribly important to investors; distinguishing the significant from the insignificant manage-
ment integrity information may require delicate judgment. 
Nevertheless, framing the issue in terms of the importance of information to investors at 
least clarifies the materiality discussion and eliminates distracting polemical debate. Under 
this approach, there is less room for the incautious and unsupportable generalizations Karmel 
favors, of which the following is a rather typical example: 
The disclosure of economically immaterial information . . . is confusing to investors and 
expensive for issuers. It is a regulatory cost that should not be borne for the sake of such a 
subjective and ephemeral concept as management integrity. . . . To permit the SEC to 
define materiality by its notions of management integrity is to give the government license 
to prosecute anyone of whom it disapproves. 
P. 240. 
52. See notes 41 & 50 supra and accompanying text. 
53. Branch & Rubright, supra note 33, at 1472 n.100 (quoting from SEC v. Chicago Heli-
copter Indus., No. 79-C-0469 slip op. at n.2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 1980), vacated, No. 79-C-0469 
slip op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 1980). See also Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. 
J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("No matter how the ... rule is 
construed, indeed even if it explicitly stated such a duty, corporate management would not 
announce . . . an intention to violate laws. It is simply contrary to human nature. The rule, if 
it were construed to require this, would never succeed in its purpose of bringing such disclo-
sure to the shareholders."), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980). 
54. Karmel also believes that mandated disclosure ofunadjudicated violations is improper, 
but for a different reason: She argues that such disclosure unduly restricts management's free-
dom of action. P. 244. I am more troubled by the prospect of SEC enforcement officials 
investigating and, in effect, adjudicating violations of substantive laws and regulations about 
which they know very little. Why, for example, should the Commission staff be entrusted with 
authority effectively to enforce (albeit in the guise of disclosure policy) state liquor laws, fed-
eral banking laws, or foreign currency regulations? 
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Beyond all this, thinking about disclosure theory provokes more 
fundamental and abstract questions regarding the materiality con-
cept. Nearly all discussions of corporate disclosure, including 
Karmel's, assume that materiality, properly understood, offers a 
meaningful standard for imposing disclosure obligations. Debates 
about materiality generally address the issue I consider above: How 
should the concept be "properly understood"? Should materiality, 
for example, at times embrace financially irrelevant information, or 
instead be limited to information that is plainly economically signifi-
cant to investors? Karmel, of course, writes in this tradition, confin-
ing her critique to the assertion that the Commission has improperly 
construed the meaning of materiality. 
Thus far, I have suggested merely that Karmel's discussion of 
materiality is unsatisfying, but have not broached the larger issue she 
and most others ignore: Is there reason to believe that, in the final 
analysis, materiality itself may be a meaningless criterion on which 
to predicate disclosure requirements? Is materiality, in short, a con-
cept ultimately devoid of meaningful content? 
On reflection, I believe that the concept of materiality may in-
deed offer little guidance for resolving the hardest disclosure cases. 
While this is not the place for a full exposition of my views, a brief 
discussion would, I think, be useful for considering Karmel's analy-
sis from a somewhat broader perspective. At the same time, I may 
· be able to demonstrate why I believe problems of disclosure theory 
are far more difficult and complex than Karmel suggests.55 
I have argued that Karmel errs in assuming investor uninterest in 
information bearing on management's integrity or competence but 
having no immediate economic significance. But why would inves-
tors have an interest in such information? Presumably, investors seek 
primarily, if not exclusively, to enhance their wealth.56 It follows 
that information is relevant to investors to the extent that it relates to 
attainment of that goal. In other words, investors care about man-
agement's honesty and competence because, at least in the long run, 
those factors are likely to affect the company's performance and 
therefore shareholder wealth. 
To so observe, of course, is to infer from Karmel's own analysis 
the incorrectness of her argument that only immediately economi-
55. I do not address the view that a disclosure policy aimed at providing the average inves-
tor with individual firm-oriented information is fundamentally misguided. See, e.g., H. 
KR!PKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 24-
36 (1979); Kripke,A Searchfor Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW, 293, 305-
17 (1975); Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 1151, 1153 (1970). Rather, my co=ents here concern the meaningfulness of materiality 
as a disclosure standard. Compare Sargent, Book Review, 12 BALT. L. REV. 371, 381 (1983) 
(reviewing REGULATION BY PROSECUTION). 
56. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text. 
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cally important information is material; her mistake is to exclude 
from the domain of materiality information that is in fact relevant to 
the investor's economic interests, which she concedes (and Congress 
. and the Commission agree) ought to be the touchstone for fashion-
ing disclosure requirements. The problem with Karmel's standard 
of materiality, then, is that it would define as immaterial information 
that is important to economically motivated investors.57 
But, as thus construed, what does the materiality standard really 
tell us about how and where to draw the line between disclosable 
information and that which need not be produced? The answer, I 
believe, is that it tells us very little. Indeed, my criticisms of 
Karmel's arguments regarding qualitative materiality themselves re-
veal the ultimate emptiness of the materiality concept for deciding 
the most confounding disclosure issues. 
My central criticism of Karmel's discussion of qualitatively sig-
nifi.cant information is that she mistakenly strays from the proper 
test of materiality: Would the investor likely attach importance to 
the information in question?58 But in a real sense that is a trivial 
point (even if a valid criticism of Karmel's analysis), for it merely 
restates the very question disclosure theory must answer. 59 That is to 
say, the search for a meaningful disclosure standard for management 
integrity information is scarcely advanced by the observation that 
such information should be deemed material where it is probably 
important to investors; the hardest question - precisely which man-
agement integrity information, in which circumstances, is important 
to investors? - remains unanswered. 
My point may be made more generally. Materiality is an un-
helpful guide for resolving the hardest cases because of the "essential 
indeterminacy"60 of the concept itself. I have suggested that a sound 
disclosure theory must focus on the importance of information to 
investors. But only in the easiest cases (j.e., where information is 
immediately quantitatively signifi.cant) is there general agreement on 
that issue. The problem, of course, in the harder cases involving 
qualitatively significant information, where such general agreement 
is lacking, is actually deciding whether information is important to 
investors. How can one determine whether shareholders attach sig-
nifi.cance to information having no immediate bearing on their com-
57. In another context, Philip Soper has described this as "the problem of collapse or con-
gruence of result." Soper, On The Relevance of Philosophy to Law: Reflections on Ackerman's 
Private Property and the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. R.E.v. 44, 44 (1979): "Just when one 
believes he has isolated a strongly entrenched intuition, demonstrating the untenability of one 
theory or the other, defenders of the theory counter with a sophisticated proof that, as respects 
the critical intuition, both theories agree in result." 
58. See notes 22 & 23 supra and accompanying text. 
59. Cf. note 57 supra. 
60. Soper, supra note 57, at 53. 
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pany's performance? The materiality standard, however precisely 
articulated, merely poses the question; the answer must lie 
elsewhere. 
Perhaps ironically, these observations may inspire sympathy for 
Karmel's plea that materiality be construed as a narrow, quantitative 
standard. Our inability to resolve the harder cases objectively and 
predictably may suggest diverse or shifting societal values regarding 
the importance of qualitative information.61 Why not opt for the 
relative certainty of a quantitative measure, at least until we reach a 
more reliable consensus on the significance of qualitative informa-
tion? This would also produce a disclosure standard that the Com-
mission could administer easily and consistently, itself an estimable 
achievement. 
Nevertheless, the suggestion that such a consensus is possible 
may be misleading, in which case recognizing the inherent indeter-
minacy of the materiality concept seems a wiser course than striving 
for a spurious precision.62 Moreover, the basic criticism of Karmel's 
approach to disclosure theory remains. If, as I argue, much of the 
information she would exclude as immaterial is, in some ultimate 
sense, economically relevant to investors, then the question she prof-
fers as the key to understanding materiality is unhelpful. The very 
language of the discussion she joins is, finally, meaningless; on this 
view, what is most disappointing about her call for certainty is that it 
represents a missed opportunity for raising the level of the material-
ity debate. 
On balance, therefore, it appears that materiality is an infinitely 
more complicated concept than Karmel allows. I have not at-
tempted in this short space to solve aU of the difficult problems that 
arise regarding materiality; rather, I have tried to show where 
Karmel's analysis falls short, and in so doing to refine the questions 
one must ask in sensibly discussing disclosure theory. While that 
process itself may yield some answers, others are less obvious. What 
is important here, I suppose, is to recognize that Karmel's approach 
is dangerously simplistic.63 
61. Cf. Id. at 64. 
62. Professor Soper's citation of Aristotle is apt: "To look for more is to ignore the injunc-
tion of one of the first philosophers to seek 'precision in each class of things just as far as the 
nature of the subject admits.'" Id. at 64 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, I. iii. 
1094b. 24-25 (W.D. Ross trans. 1925) (footnote omitted). 
63. I have not separately addressed Karmel's treatment of SEC policy regarding share-
holder proposals. She claims, essentially, that the Commission should be more censorious 
with respect to the inclusion of such proposals in management proxy materials, excluding 
those proposals which are not economically material to investors. Pp. 245-47. Not only does 
she assume too readily that shareholders have no interest in economically immaterial matters, 
she virtually ignores the classic justifications for preserving and strengthening the shareholder 
proposal mechanism - that it enhances shareholder communications, often has a salutary (if 
indirect) impact on management and, if nothing else, provides "a healthy safety valve for the 
discussion of views critical of the corporation." P. 246. See, e.g., B. LONGSTRETH & H, Ro-
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III 
In the last two chapters of her book, Karmel reveals that the ac-: 
tual target of her attack is Congress. Thus, despite the invective 
against the Commission that fills the preceding chapters, Karmel's 
real thesis, it develops, is that the promotion of investment should 
replace narrower notions of investor protection as the focus of secu-
rities regulation. Congress, she argues, must amend the Commis-
sion's charter to make plain the paramount importance of capital 
formation. In short, her lengthy "brief against the SEC's 
prosecutorial orientation" (p. 16) has been merely introductory; her 
true goal is "sweeping reform" (p. 256) of the securities laws 
themselves. 64 
Apart from the substance of her argument, Karmel's presentation 
is poorly organized and needlessly confusing. Although she earlier 
hints at her ultimate focus, 65 the reader is genuinely surprised by her 
sudden shift. The result is a book that appears disjointed and slap-
dash, confirming one's conviction that this is less than careful 
work.66 
More pointedly, however, Karmel's ''brief' for law reform is it-
SENBLOOM, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 19 
(1973); Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1970); 
Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign G.M., 69 MICH. L. REV. 
421 (1971). Again, while there may be grounds for criticizing the Commission's approach, see, 
e.g., Manne, Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 STAN. L. REv. 481 
(1972), Karmel's analysis is shrill and unhelpful. See also SEC Release No. 34-20091, FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,417 (Aug. 16, 1983) (amending the shareholder proposal rule, SEC 
Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1983), but essentially preserving basic framework of the 
rule). 
64. Karmel does observe that she is "not persuaded that the SEC's institutional survival as 
an independent commission is necessarily in the general public interest," suggesting that it be 
recast as an executive agency, subject "to some effective Presidential control." P. 91. But her 
suggestion rests on her claim that the Commission's significant impact on the economy calls 
for executive control "as to matters of policy that override a singular mandate such as investor 
protection." P. 91. In other words, her plea for reforming the Commission into a "meaningful 
instrument for carrying out national economic policy,'' p. 61, derives less from her allegations 
of prosecutorial orientation than from her proposal to substitute capital formation for investor 
prot.ection as the Commission's primary concern. P. 294. 
Karmel herself seems ambivalent about the value of preserving the Commission's indepen-
dence. Thus, despite her view that "[t]he SEC's independence is, in part, an attitude of resist-
ance to outside interference,'' p. 87, she concedes that "[o]ne worthwhile fact of the SEC's 
independence . . . is that the Commission has developed a highly competent staff with un-
usual esprit de corps." P. 90. Moreover, as I discuss below, her argument for changing the 
Commission's mandate is itself poorly developed and unconvincing. Compare PRESIDENT'S 
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 5-7, 
99-106 (1971). 
65. See, e.g., pp. 33, 61, 76. 
66. It is not until page 294 (of a total of 339 pages of text) that Karmel explicitly states her 
principal point: . 
[T]he SEC's primary concern in the 1980s should be capital formation. The statutes and 
their implementation by the SEC should be tested against whether they encourage savings 
and the deployment of savings in investments that contribute to productivity in the Amer-
ican economy. 
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self thin and unconvincing, seeming almost an afterthought added 
hastily to the book. She begins by conceding that the Commission 
alone can accomplish very little, 67 which leads her to focus on 
Congress: 
[T]he securities laws are not now drafted in such a way that capital 
formation is necessarily part of the public interest to which the Com-
mission refers in taking action. . . . 
. . . [T]he Securities and Exchange Commission . . . has no direct 
statutory mandate to promote investment. . . . 
. . . To suggest to a staff with any integrity that they simply stop 
enforcing the law that exists is wrong. . . . The ideological energies of 
a productive staff need to be turned to the solution of new problems 
specifically identified by Congress. [Pp. 298, 299, 302]. 
She therefore proposes that the securities laws be amended to 
make capital formation the SEC's principal concem;68 while she ad-
mits that investor protection fosters investor confidence, which 
surely enhances capital formation, she believes that where the two 
goals clash, investor protection must yield (p. 298). This prescription, 
she claims, will revitalize American industry, increase employment 
and productivity and improve the national welfare. 
Karmel's argument is unpersuasive. First, her tangible sugges-
tions for amending the securities laws are rather feeble. She recom-
mends that the preambles to the 1933 and 1934 Acts be changed to 
include the purpose "to promote capital formation and business pro-
ductivity" (p. 301), and proposes adding to both statutes "a carefully 
crafted regulatory analysis requirement" (p. 301) to ensure that the 
Commission examines the costs and competitive e.ff ects of disclosure 
rules. These modest amendments seem unlikely to accomplish the 
"sweeping reform" Karmel favors. 
Second, she to<;> readily sacrifices investor protection for goals 
that may not be accomplished by the reform she proposes. Nobody, 
including Karmel, has demonstrated that relaxing the protections af-
forded by the securities laws will help revitalize the American econ-
67. [T]here are severe limitations on the ability of an independent regulatory agency to 
undertake substantive regulatory reform on its own initiative. The political imagination 
and daring needed to move in new directions, to dismantle old and outdated programs 
and engage in new programs must take root outside the Co=ission. After all, the es-
sence of an administrative agency is to administer the programs of the Legislative and 
Executive branches of government. . . . 
. . . In the final analysis, changing the direction and methodology of government reg-
ulation will require law reform, not just regulatory reform. 
P. 297. These observations, of course, make inapposite much of Karmel's earlier criticism of 
the Co=ission. One consequence of her extended but misdirected reproach is to divert atten-
tion from her chief concern, enhancing capital formation. 
68. See note 66 supra. 
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omy.69 Until that case has been made more convincingly, trading 
investor protection for capital formation, even if only where the two 
goals conflict, seems unwise. 
Finally, pervading Karmel's discussion is the implicit claim that 
the Commission has viewed its role too narrowly, in a sense, by re-
fusing actively to promote capital formation. While she recognizes 
that it rests with Congress ultimately to redefine the Commission's 
perspective, her argument raises fundamental questions about the ef-
fectiveness of administrative agencies. She assumes, apparently, that 
the SEC can be made more effective by broadening its charge, but 
that is a controversial assumption which demands close scrutiny. 
Had Karmel addressed this issue, she might have become convinced, 
with others, that "the effectiveness of the SEC over the years has 
been a product of the narrow scope of its jurisdiction . . . ."70 It is 
by now clear, however, that Karmel's vision is decidedly different. 
CONCLUSION 
Bad books are always disappointing. They are especially disap-
pointing when, owing to the author's talent and experience, one ex-
pects so much more. Regulation by Prosecution is an especially 
disappointing book, not the least because of Roberta Karmel's de-
served reputation for intellect and conviction. In the end, that is 
what most rankles about this book. 
69. As Norman Poser has suggested, Poser, Regulation by Prosecution (Book Review), 15 
REv. SEC. REG. 876, 877 (1982), it is noteworthy that equity financing is relatively unimportant 
as a means of raising capital in this country. Since most financing is accomplished either 
internally or through borrowing, one doubts whether easier access to the markets would signif-
icantly enhance capital formation. One can argue, as Professor Poser notes, that the very re-
luctance of companies to resort to the equity markets supports Karmel's view, but diluting 
investor protection on the basis of such speculative evidence seems unreasonably hazardous. 
70. Longstreth, The SEC After Fifty Years: An Assessment of Its Past and Future (Book 
Review), 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (1983) (reviewing J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF WALL STREET - A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND 
MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1982)) (emphasis added). 
